a form of a precedent (or a reference point) for a repeat player in figuring out the judgment pattern of courts for future cases.
Often these two types of correlation exist simultaneously in some areas of repeated litigation, such as asbestos cases. In this article, however, for analytical clarity, we examine the two features of precedents separately. We first investigate how correlated decisions affect litigants' incentives for settlement. We show that there is some critical threshold level in the defendant's winning probability against the first plaintiff such that when his winning probability is higher (lower) than this threshold level, the equilibrium settlement rate will be higher (lower) than it would be when there is no precedent. This can be easily explained. When the defendant is less likely to win at trial against the first plaintiff (relative to some threshold winning probability), he has an incentive to make a larger settlement offer relative to the situation where there is no precedent. This is because if the case goes to trial in the first period, the defendant (with a small winning probability) will face the possibility of an unfavorable precedent being set, which will hurt him in the second period. To avoid this unwelcome consequence, the defendant will make a higher settlement offer in the first period. This will increase the first period's settlement rate. Conversely, if the defendant's winning probability is high in the first period, he is more likely to risk trial, and more so as the precedential value increases.
Two interesting implications can be obtained from this observation. First, when the parties can influence a trial outcome through litigation efforts, they will front-load their efforts to the initial (precedent-setting) stage, because setting a favorable precedent is more effective than fighting against an unfavorable one already set. This might explain why landmark cases often lead to intensive campaigns by those most likely to be affected by the resulting precedents.
Second, the settlement behavior under correlated decisions indicates that the defendant is more aggressive against a plaintiff with a low winning probability than against the one with a high winning probability. The defendant's differing responses to plaintiffs based on their likelihood of prevailing at trial may imply that correlated decisions discourage nuisance suits (just as the European fee system does).
Finally, when damages are correlated across periods, we find that the initial trial gives the defendant a valuable learning opportunity, enabling him to make an offer better tailored to the subsequent plaintiff. This learning opportunity may induce the defendant to risk trial more often than otherwise.
There have been some legal studies on the collateral estoppel doctrine,6 but most of them are concerned about the fairness issue arising from nonmutual application of the doctrine. A couple of recent articles (Spurr, 1991; Note, 1992) have formally analyzed the implications of the doctrine on the welfare of disputing parties. In particular, Note (1992) identified the possibility that defendants facing a sequence of plaintiffs are extorted through settlement by the initial plaintiffs when the collateral estoppel doctrine is applied unfavorably against the defendants. Our approach differs from these previous ones in that we attempt to draw implications on the settlement incentives, intertemporal allocation of litigation efforts, and nuisance suits.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews a one-period litigation problem. Section 3 introduces repeated litigation with correlated decisions and examines parties' settlement behavior, and Section 4 explores further implications of correlated decisions. In Section 5, we provide a numerical example to illustrate our findings. Finally, Section 6 examines correlated damages.
A Review of One-Period Litigation
In this section, we review a one-period problem. This review provides some useful results that are used in our analysis on precedents. Also, the one-period problem later serves as a point of contrast, because, absent precedents, the two-period model is equivalent to a replication of two one-period games. The parties are risk neutral, and the American fee system under which each party bears his own litigation costs is adopted. The following notation is used throughout: w = plaintiff's damage, distributed over [0,w,] F(w) = a twice differentiable distribution function of w with a positive densityf. s = the defendant's settlement offer. c = the plaintiff's litigation costs. d = the defendant's litigation costs. p = the plaintiff's winning probability. A litigation cycle consists of three stages. In the first stage, the plaintiff is privately informed about w, while the defendant knows only its probability distribution, F(w). In the second stage, the defendant makes a settlement offer s on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In the last stage, the game ends if the plaintiff accepts the offer, but the case goes to trial if the plaintiff rejects it. This oneperiod problem is similar to Bebchuk (1984) in that pretrial bargaining involves an uninformed party making an offer to an informed party.
We use backward induction to solve for each party's optimal decision rule.7 In the last stage, the plaintiff would accept an offer if and only if it is no less than what she expects to gain from trial. That is, an optimal decision rule for plaintiff, [P], with damage w is [P] Accept s(> 0), if and only if (iff) s >-pw -c.8
7. The equilibrium concept we use is that of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. 8. We restrict attention to nonnegative offers because the plaintiff can always refuse a negative offer and either go to trial or drop the case (when the expected net trial recovery is negative). s +~ c Let w(s) =-denote a threshold-type plaintiff, who is indifferent be-P tween settling and going to trial at the given s. In the second stage, the defendant makes a settlement offer s to minimize the expected loss. Since there is a one-to-one correnspendence between s and the threshold type w(s), without loss of generality, the defendant can be regarded as picking the threshold type w = w(s). It is convenient to work with this threshold level rather than the settlement offer, since the equilibrium value of the threshold level will provide an intuitive measure of the likelihood of settlement. (The settlement likelihood will be simply F(w), the probability that the plaintiff has lower judgment than the threshold type.)9 Let s(w) = w,p -c denote the minimum offer needed to induce the threshold type to settle. Then, the defendant's decision rule, [D], can be expressed as ing the defendant's optimization problems, we restrict attention to interior solutions. 10 9. A settlement offer can be a misleading indicator for the settlement probability. When the plaintiff's winning probability increases, in equilibrium the defendant may increase his offer, and yet the settlement rate can go down, since the plaintiff now demands more.
10. This is just to simplify our exposition and does not change the qualitative results of this article. As can be easily checked, incorporating comer solutions just changes strict inequalities to weak inequalities in all the subsequent propositions. This first-order condition is similar to the one obtained in Bebchuk (1984) and has a similar interpretation: The defendant optimally balances benefits and costs of increasing the settlement offer. An incremental increase in the settlement offer, say by ds, increases the defendant's loss for the settlement range [which accounts for the whole inframarginal types whose measure is F(w(s))]. But it also increases the settlement rate byf(w(s)) ds F(w(s)) and enp ds ables the defendant to save the litigation costs c + d at the margin. At the optimum, these marginal benefits must equal the marginal costs. This firstorder condition is necessary for the offer to be optimal. It is also sufficient if the inverse hazard rate is strictly increasing. 12 Roughly speaking, this implies that the marginal cost is increasing in the settlement offer. This assumption is labeled as [A1] and used throughout the article.
The following lemma reports some important comparative static results that we will refer to in later sections. All the proofs, including that of Lemma 1, are relegated to the Appendix. The second statement implies that the defendant's welfare is reduced when the trial prospect becomes less favorable. The argument for the first statement is less trivial. It implies that settlement is less likely the more likely is the plaintiff to win the trial. Intuitively, with higher p, the defendant finds it harder to get his offer accepted because the plaintiff demands more to forgo a trial option (which has become more favorable). Therefore, at the same threshold level w the marginal benefits from increasing s are reduced, while its marginal costs remain the same. Thus, the equilibrium settlement rate goes down.13
Settlement Behavior under Correlated Decisions
In this section, we extend the one-period model to study the effect of correlated decisions. In this extension, the litigation cycle described in the previous section is repeated twice. To model correlated decisions, we assume that the second plaintiff's winning probability depends on the outcome of the first case: Her winning probability increases (decreases) when the first plaintiff 11. The reason that the defendant saves the whole litigation cost (not just his portion d) through settlement is because, being the first mover in the bargaining game, he extracts all the surplus the plaintiff receives from settlement. Although this particular result appears model-specific, it is not essential to the central points we make in this paper.
12. This condition roughly says that the density function ft() does not grow too fast. It is satisfied with most of the well-known distribution functions, including the uniform, exponential, and normal distributions.
13. Whether the defendant would want to raise his settlement offer as p increases depends on the elasticity e, of H with respect to w. The equilibrium settlement offer will increase in p iff eCH S 1. wins (loses), while it remains unchanged when the first case is settled. Let pl, P2 denote the first and second plaintiff's winning probabilities, respectively. Formally, then, P2 is determined in the following way: Ps = P, if the first case is settled ("S"); P2 jPW = P + SE, if the first plaintiff wins trial ("W"); PL = P -Ed if the first plaintiff loses trial ("L"), where p and e are such that 0 < p -Ed < P + Ep < 1. From now on, all the other variables will be similarly subscriptized by 1, 2, S, W, and L. Here the parameters Ep and ed measure the precedential effect of the first trial on the second case. Specifically, ep denotes an added winning probability for the second plaintiff when the first plaintiff wins trial, which may result from an application of the so-called "offensive collateral estoppel doctrine." Under the doctrine, the defendant is prohibited from relitigating an issue decided against him in an earlier trial. Similarly, Ed can measure the likelihood of the application of the "defensive collateral estoppel doctrine," which prohibits the second plaintiff from relitigating an issue decided against the first plaintiff. In most of this article, we take the precedential effect to be "mutual" (i.e., p, Ed > 0) and, when simplicity serves exposition, "symmetric" (i.e., Ep = Ed = ). However, as a thought experiment-and, more importantly, as reflection of current debates14-we also consider extreme cases where the precedential effect is "nonmutual" Note that the second plaintiff reacts to a given settlement offer differently. In the case of the mutual precedential effect, she is less willing to settle when the first plaintiff wins trial (i.e., demands more to settle) and more willing to settle when the first plaintiff loses. Her winning probability, however, will remain unaffected if the first case is settled. Consequently, the settlement rate is the highest, lowest, and in between in the second period if the first plaintiff loses, wins, and settles, respectively.
Let Lr and UT denote the defendant's expected second-period loss and the second plaintiff's expected utility when the first case is tried. Then, Lr = PiLw + (1 -Pl)LL, and UT = PIUW + (1 -P)UL, where Li and Ui are defined in the same way as L* and U* with p replaced by pi. Now, we are in a position to discuss the first-period problem. Since the first plaintiff is a short-run player, her optimal decision is the same as in the oneperiod game (i.e., The intuition behind the proposition is transparent from the above argument. Since with the mutual precedential effect the first plaintiff's winning probability p, coincides with the likelihood of an unfavorable precedent being set for the defendant, ifp1 is sufficiently high (low), the defendant is willing to raise (lower) his offer to avoid (face) trial. If the precedent is nonmutual, this proposition predicts a unilateral result. Under the offensive collateral estoppel, any precedent is unfavorable to the defendant (LT < Ls), so the defendant tries to avoid trial regardless of his winning probability relative to the oneperiod problem. By the same token, under the nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel, the defendant is eager to go to court to establish a favorable precedent for the second period regardless of Pl.
We next examine how changes in the magnitude of precedential effect influence the parties' settlement incentives. To this end, we again focus on the cost of precedent setting, Lr -Ls. Since the increase in pro-plaintiff precedencial value, ep, makes a pro-plaintiff precedent more unfavorable to the defendant without affecting a pro-defendant precedent, the cost, Lr -Ls, increases with Ep, while the opposite is true for an increase in the prodefendant precedential value Ed. The following proposition follows from this observation.
Proposition 2. (i)
The first-period equilibrium settlement probability and offer are increasing (decreasing) in e, (Ed). Suppose the precedential effect is symmetric (i.e., Ep = ed = e); then (ii) the first-period equilibrium settlement rate and offer are increasing (decreasing) in the simultaneous increase in Ep = Ed = e if P1 is sufficiently high (low); (iii) P > 1 for all e > 0; and (iv) P increases with e.
The second result is not obvious because it refers to the simultaneous increase in pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant precedential values. The intuition behind the result can be explained as follows. When pi is sufficiently high (the case with sufficiently low pi is analogous), the defendant puts more weight to the pro-plaintiff precedential value, Ep, even if both ep and Ed increase by the same magnitude, since the former is more likely to be realized. Cases (iii) and (iv) concern the behavior of the threshold probability. That the threshold probability is greater than one-half may be surprising given the symmetry of the precedential effect. The implied bias toward trial is due to the fact that the defendant can exploit the option value associated with trial.15 Depending on 15. It is useful to interpret Lr as a lottery of taking Lw 2 L*(p + e) and L1r L*(p -e) with probabilityp, and (1 -pi), respectively. Whenp, = i, Lr represents an actuarially fair lottery for a certain loss expected from settlement (LS = L*(p)). Since L* is concave in p, the defendant prefers the actuarially fair lottery of losses to a certain loss. the first trial outcome, the defendant will face different prospects to respond in the second period. This creates the option value for the defendant: With variable winning probabilities, he can tailor his settlement offer on each contingency and can do better than when faced with a fixed winning probability. The intuition for the last result is similar.
Further Implications of Correlated Decisions 4.1 Front-loading of Litigation Efforts
When an issue before the court raises broad public interests, there are often intensive efforts on both sides in the initial precedent-setting stage. This is especially true in the so-called landmark cases, which have profound impact on future cases. For example, Roe v. Wade, the 1973 Supreme Court decision that legalized abortion, and Brown v. Board of Education, the 1954 Supreme Court decision that found segregation in public schools unconstitutional, are two such frequently cited cases. As we have witnessed recently, the controversy over a woman's constitutional right to abortion has drawn national attention, and people on both sides of the issue have staged aggressive campaigns to win the court's favor. The underlying force that drives these efforts is the concern over precedents. To explore this issue within our framework, let us now suppose that each party of litigation can influence the winning probability by undertaking efforts in the two periods. By examining how effort in each period affects the welfare of each party, we can study the relative effectiveness of effort in one period over effort in another period. First, to measure the defendant's first-period incentive for litigation effort, we compute the total derivative of the indirect utility function in [Dl] with respect to pi. This shows the extent to which a given increase in the winning probability improves the defendant's welfare.
dL, _ aLwd dLpp = (1 -F(w))(L -LL) + wdF + F(wl)WI,
Reducing p, has both long-term and short-term effects. The first term of the right-hand side represents the long-term effect, and the remaining two terms represent the short-term effect. The short-term effect captures a direct benefit the defendant receives by improving his winning chance in the first period. The long-term effect measures the expected benefit of setting a favorable precedent.
Similarly, the defendant's second-period incentive for litigation effort can be measured by dL (p) _ wdF + F(i)i, dp depending on the first-period outcome i = W, L, and S. Notice that the longterm effect is absent in the second period since the defendant has no preceden-tial effect to worry about. If these short-term effect terms are not much different, the first-period incentive will be greater than the second-period incentive, due to the precedential effect. Thus, we have the following proposition. Under the identified circumstances, this proposition confirms a familiar notion that it is more important to set a favorable precedent than to fight against the unfavorable one already set. That an increased precedential effect makes the first-period effort relatively more important is also intuitive. The immediate implication of this proposition is that the defendant is likely to front-load his effort to the initial precedent-setting stage. This will be indeed the case if the defendant faces a standard symmetric, increasing disutility function D(-Pl,-P2), associated with his winning probability in each period. If, in addition, the two period efforts are substitutes (i.e., (-p ) (-p > 0 ) \ a(-P1 )o(-P2) / the front-loading effect is likely to be acute, since the defendant will try to divert this effort away from the second period into the first period. 16 Several remarks are in order. First, the first condition has an intuitive explanation. In our model, the precedential effect arises only through trial. Since low litigation costs make trial more likely, this implies that setting a good precedent becomes more important when the litigation costs are smaller. Second, the hypotheses of the proposition are sufficient conditions.'7 Thus, the results may hold even when the conditions are not met. (We conjecture this to be the case for a wide range of parameter values.) Finally, the result of the proposition does not depend on whether the precedential effect is mutual or not. This is because the long-term incentive for the first-period effort depends only on Lw^ -LL, the second-period welfare difference in winning and losing.
Given the way our model is structured, the front-loading effect does not apply to the plaintiffs. They are essentially myopic and lack the long-term 
Effects on Nuisance Suits
One growing concern in the United States is that too many frivolous suits, or nuisance suits, are brought to courts. Many of these suits are filed by plaintiffs solely to extract settlement offers without strong court cases (see Bebchuk, 1988) . A frequently suggested solution to deter such nuisance suits has been the European fee system, under which a losing party pays for all the litigation costs of both parties. The reason the European fee system may discourage nuisance suits better than the American fee system is because the former is more discriminatory than the latter against plaintiffs with low winning probabilities. In our model, this is represented by the fact that the expected utility of a plaintiff is a steeper function of her winning probability under the European fee system than under the American fee system. Letting UE denote the expected utility of plaintiffs under the European fee system, it can be easily shown that in our model, 18. We thank Mitch Polinsky for suggesting this example. Amicus curiae means, literally, a friend of the court. A person with strong interest in, or views on, the subject matter of an action may petition the court for permission to file a brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party. Such amicus curiae briefs are commonly filed in appeals concerning matters of a broad public interest. See Black's Law Dictionary.
19. Note that these preemptive efforts could be socially wasteful because both parties' efforts may wash out each other without changing the overall trial outcome. Also note that this idea applies to nonlegal contexts as well. If there is network exterality, or strong path-dependence, initial small investment matters a lot (Arthur, 1987; David, 1984) . In this situation, economic agents will try to turn the initial event in their favor, as the battle between VHS and Beta Max graphically shows in the context of the VCR market penetration.
UE 2 U* iffp 2 di d 20 (Recall that U* is the expected utility of the plaintiff in the one-period model under the American fee system.)
To illustrate how the two systems differ in their abilities to deter nuisance suits, suppose a plaintiff must incur some fixed costs, tp, such as pre-filing investigation costs, to bring a suit. We assume that these costs are incurred before the plaintiff is informed of her damage. This assumption mainly serves expositional clarity,21 but it is not without realism. It will hold if, for example, a victim must have a costly medical examination to assess her injury before filing a suit. Facing some pre-filing costs, plaintiffs with low winning probabilities will not find it attractive to bring suits. Let pE(Jp) and pA(p) denote threshold probabilities below which plaintiffs will not file suits under the European system and under the American system, respectively. As That is, the threshold probability under the European system is greater than that under the American system, which implies that more nuisance suits are deterred under the European fee system, provided that parties' litigation costs do not differ much. This result is consistent with Shavell (1982). We argue in this section that correlated decisions can exercise similar deterrent effects on nuisance suits. The key observation here is that correlated decisions give the defendant extra incentives to be tougher against a plaintiff with a low winning probability. Recall from Proposition 1 that the defendant makes a smaller settlement offer (than when decisions are not correlated) to the plaintiffs with winning probability less than P9 E (,1). It easily follows from this that U1 < U* iffp, < p,; that is, the first plaintiff's expected utility is 20. This can be shown by following the usual steps. Under the European fee system, the optimal decision rule of the plaintiff with damage w is to [ 
PE] Accept s iff s pw -(1 -p)(c + d).
Defining sE (,) as the minimum offer to induce settlement with type rv, the defendant's problem is to solve This proposition is a direct result of applying Propositions 1 and 2. If the precedential effect is symmetric or favorable to the defendant, we know that the threshold probability, P, is greater than one-half (unity in the case of defensive collateral estoppel); hence precedents deter more lawsuits whose winning probabilities are less than one-half. On the other hand, under the nonmutual offensive collateral esteppol, the threshold probability is zero; hence, nuisance suits are encouraged relative to a case without precedents.
This suggests that common law courts under the American fee system may mimic the performance of the European fee system in deterring nuisance suits, unless the precedential effect is unilaterally in favor of the plaintiffs. The intuition is basically the same: Like the European fee system, correlated decisions tend to discriminate against a plaintiff with a low winning proba-bility. The mechanism of discrimination, however, is different. Under correlated decisions, it is implemented by differing attitudes of the defendant toward plaintiffs with different winning probabilities: The defendant is more aggressive in going to trial against the plaintiff with a lower winning probability in order to set a favorable precedent.22
Numerical Example
In this section, we present some numerical examples. The purpose of our numerical exercise is to see (i) how a settlement probability changes as Pl increases at any given e; and (ii) whether the American fee system with correlated decisions can perform as well as the European system. In our simulation, w is uniformly distributed withf = l/w, and w = 200, and c = d = 10. In our first example, the size of e varies from 0.1 to 0.3. Figure 2 largely confirms the finding of Proposition 1. There is a threshold level of Ap slightly above 0.5 such that correlated decisions make settlement more (less) likely when the first plaintiff's winning probability is higher (lower) than P1I Figure 2 also shows that the precedential effect e reinforces this effect on the settlement rate. Figure 3 illustrates that the UE curve is steeper than the U* curve and d crosses at p = + = 0.5. When the precedential value is set at e = 0.3, the American fee system tracks almost perfectly the European fee system in terms of the first plaintiff's expected utility in the low range of p. Moreover, when pi is high, the plaintiff's expected utility is greater under the American fee system with correlated decisions than under the European fee system. This suggests that in the context of repeated litigation the American fee system might be more efficient because while low-probability cases are eliminated to the same extent, meritorious claims do better under the American fee system.
Correlated Damages
This section analyzes the effects of correlated damages on the litigants' settlement behavior. As mentioned earlier, in factually similar cases, judgment awards tend to be correlated across periods, even though a prior court's damage awards do not have any legally binding effect.23 This is especially true when damages are correlated across cases, since court judgments are likely to reflect the correlated damages. In this situation, the initial court action can reveal some information that the defendant (who is uninformed about the actual damages) may find useful in inferring the future plaintiffs' damages. A successful inference about future cases helps the defendant to 22. This is not to suggest that precedents can replace the European fee system in deterring nuisance suits. For one thing, the deterrence effect of precedents is relevant only in a repeatedlitigation situation.
23. The fact that courts are not bound by prior judgment awards distinguishes this situation from the correlated decisions. We consider a slightly modified model in which the second plaintiff's damage, w2, is positively correlated with the first plaintiff's damage, w1. Liabilities are no longer correlated; that is, plaintiffs in both periods are assumed to have the same winning probability p. Assume first that w2 is distributed over the same support as w, according to a conditional distribution function G(w2wi), with its probability density function g(w2jwl). The following assumptions modify our original hazard rate condition to a new distribution and conceptualize a correlation relationship between w2 and wl: The monotone likelihood ratio property establishes w, as a monotonic signal about w2 (Milgrom, 1981) . According to this property, that the first plaintiff has a high damage is an informative indication that the second plaintiff also has a high damage. In our context, this assumption implies that k(w2(wl) is decreasing in wl.
Ok Lemma 2. [A2] implies
< 0.
Recall our notational convention under which wi denotes the first-period threshold type of the plaintiff, and w , WL, w denote the second-period threshold types given that the first-period outcomes are S, L, and W, respectively. As before, corresponding settlement offers are defined as s(ii) = wip -c for i = 1, S, L, W. Again we start backwards. Consider the second period first. Suppose that the first case was settled. Then, the defendant can infer that the first-period damage is less than wl. On the other hand, if the first case had gone to court and the defendant won the trial, then he learns that the firstperiod damage is greater than W,. However, had the defendant lost the trial, the actual damage in the first period, wl, is revealed through the judgment award by the first court. In the second period, the defendant will tailor his settlement offer based on this inferred information about the first-period damage. Since Wil summarizes all the necessary information in the first two cases, we can write Wi(wl) and si(wl) to denote the defendant's second-period threshold type and offer, when the first-period outcome is indicated by i = S, L. Lastly, iw(wi) and sw(wl) are used for the case where the plaintiff won the first trial. These results characterize the way in which the defendant pegs the settlement offer on the first-period outcome. First, the defendant lowers the settlement offer if the first case was settled, since it would imply that w, E [0,Wl]. Second, the defendant raises the offer if there was a trial and he won, since it would then imply that wI E [Ei,w]. Lastly, if the defendant lost the trial, he tailors the offer on the actual first-period damage wl. Obviously, this offer would be greater than Ss(wi). In general, the defendant makes a higher offer after a trial than after a settlement. Note that this does not necessarily make the defendant want to settle in the first period. Raising the first-period settlement offer reduces the probability of going to trial, but when the case actually goes to trial, this will adjust the defendant's belief about the second plaintiff's damage even more upwardly, resulting in an even higher equilibrium offer in the second period. In fact, the only reason for the defendant to change his settlement offer comes from his learning motive. Because of the different ways in which the settlement and trial reveal information to the defendant, the defendant will adjust his settlement offer in a way that makes the most of his learning opportunities.
This Note that / can be smaller than p; that is, the result may hold for the entire types of the first plaintiff. So, the bias against settlement may be robust. Proposition 5 identifies several reasons why the defendant may learn more from trial than from settlement. One is the defendant's losing probability at the first trial. Since losing at trial reveals precise information about the first plaintiff's damage, the more likely the defendant is to lose at the trial the more likely he is to learn from trial. This is not to say that the defendant values the likelihood of losing at trial. It only suggests that he values the learning component of losing; that is, he favors trial relatively more than he otherwise would without correlated damages. The other determining force is the relative likelihood of settlement to trial. As settlement becomes more likely (for example, as the result of an increase in c + d or a decrease in p), settlement becomes less valuable in providing informative signals about the second plaintiff's damage. In general, the proposition predicts a learning bias in favor of trial.
Two comments are warranted in interpreting this result. First, in this section we have focused only on the effect of correlated damages. If the effect of correlated decisions is also present, the analyses in the previous section imply that the trial bias may be weakened. This is especially likely when the first plaintiff's winning probability is very high so that correlated decisions alone tend to encourage settlement (recall Proposition 1). Second, while disputing parties may care about learning, trial is not the only way to learn about judgment. In practice, lawyers often hire private citizens as mock jurors to test their expected judgment and to make a better inference about the awards. This is especially relevant in cases where juries rather than judges make the awards and in cases where litigation is not repeated so that parties cannot learn from previous trial.
Concluding Remarks
We have examined the role of precedents in repeated litigation. Identifying correlated decisions and correlated damages as two forms of precedents, we have shown first that the defendant is more willing to settle when an unfavorable precedent is more likely to be set, resulting in a higher settlement rate. Second, the parties will engage in preemptive campaigns to turn the precedent in their favor, which could be socially wasteful. Third, like the European fee system, the existence of precedents tends to penalize plaintiffs with low winning probabilities and discourage nuisance suits. Lastly, correlated dam-age awards provide a valuable learning opportunity to the defendant, allowing him to make a more tailored offer after experiencing an initial trial. Several further remarks are relevant for our research. What if the Plaintiff is a Repeat Player? Although our model has dealt with civil litigation in which the defendant is the only repeat player, our results do not depend on this particular setting. Consider the case where either the plaintiff or both parties are repeat players.24 Since an initial court decision has long-term effects, it still remains true that the repeat player will try to avoid litigation whenever an unfavorable precedent is likely to be set in an early stage. Note that our results are also applicable to criminal actions. Government prosecutors often take similar criminal cases, and thus, as repeat players, they have an interest in setting favorable precedents. The upshot is that the concern over precedent induces a repeat player to deviate from a shortterm best strategy.
Asymmetric Precedential Effect. Current debates over precedents have centered on the issue of fairness, that is, whether abdication of mutuality has led to an unfair outcome for one party. Our findings appear to support this view: A nonmutual precedential effect does favor one party at the expense of the other party's welfare. Also, as in Note (1992), the initial plaintiff can take advantage of the offensive collateral estoppel by extorting the defendant through higher settlement. Our analysis renders additional support to the symmetric precedent from a different perspective. According to our analysis, a symmetric precedent can provide additional benefit of deterring nuisance suits; while a precedent unilaterally adversarial to the defendant can encourage nuisance suits.
Whom to sue? When to sue? We have examined how concerns over precedents affect a repeat player's pretrial bargaining strategy. Precedential concerns can also have other interesting strategic implications. First, it can affect a repeat player's decision as to whom to litigate first. In light of our analysis, it is not hard to imagine that the repeat player would try to litigate the weakest opponent first. By confronting the weakest opponent first, he can easily establish a favorable precedent, which will put him in a better position to deal with stronger opponents later. Also, a plaintiff's decision as to when to sue can be affected by a precedential concern. If she has a good prospect of winning the case, she may postpone filing a suit until after an even more favorable precedent is set. On the other hand, if the prior assessment is not favorable, she might want to rush for a suit; since the chances will be even worse after other plaintiffs set bad precedents. dpl dp
Through some algebraic manipulation, we can write the difference of the two terms as follows:
dL _ dL = (1 -F(w ))(L -LL) + wdF + F(wI)w dp I dp 
Then, its FOC is

